The laws of nature shared in common between things for the universe as a whole have no (or little) choice in how they communicate with other things, just as the English language, though varied by accents or idioms does not spontaineously change as a whole by someone speaking differently.
By defining the universe as a persistant thing, it must maintain a static component in its definition over time and those rules by which things interact within the space of the universe define what the universe is as those physical rules are not defined to change, otherwise they would not be rules (but merely suggestions, recommendations or preferred modes of operation etc.

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So if you drop an apple and it rises, you're in a different universe than I am and could likely not communicate to me via. the internet, because it's a structure that relies upon gravity etc. to maintain it.
On the other hand, those static laws do not allow for the existance of time. A perfect law of gravity would not describe planets but perfectly repeated orbitals or truly classes of closed pathways - circles, ellipses and various greater complexity chaotic cycles.
Ironically, a law of gravity or any other finite set of precise physical laws do not allow for a planet to orbit the Sun, as they connect all such otherwise possible moments in time to predetermined objects over all time and they describe only a single state - whatever physical objects happened to be planted within that space and as all their interactions are predetermined and they'd only exist relative to this static rule as a single timeless object.
For example, the process of addition is timeless, because it never changes, but it also can't generate numbers because addition doesn't result in any specific number, nor does it only accept a single set of numbers as inputs. If it sees 2 and 5, then it simultaineously constructs 7 and the addition is not a transient thing and always shows (2,5,7) as a group. If you change the 7 to something else, such as 5 and retain the 2, then the group given by addition is the process of subtraction and we see this association as (2,3,5).
But the problem is that addition doesn't specify what's to be added and for that we need things that have termination points and are non-infinite, but are either their own beginnings or the specific results of some timeless process of some previous thing (that must have had its own beginning).
So there's really no way to logically determine whether or not objects have an inherent will unless such a possibility is something capable of logical description and it may be that there are not possible such descriptions in logic as perfect logic cannot see where it gets its information from.
On the other hand, an infinite space appears likely capable of supporting continual change over time via. rigid logical rules, but logic can't "do" infinity either and similarly we can't see infinitely far into space to determine what logic what may later derive from it, so some manner of indeterminism appears inevitably out of reach of logic and its closely tied to time, which is also interestingly tied to subjective personal perceptions and then it appears that as long as their is ever an uncertainty regarding the future, or probably as long as time exists, there is the possibility of individual will beyond logical description.
Also notice that if we had a spectrum of events from those that were perfectly deterministic to those that were never deterministic, those that there were never deterministic could not be isolated to existing relative to any specific static law of physics - a purely non-deterministic or random "thing" (if it could be described as such) would not even be localizable in space and could never be proven to either exist or not - you could never reliably repeat an experiment to prove anything regarding it - either its existance or non-existance, and the associated "random" results regarding it would continually leave it indeterminant and this leads to an interesting paradox regarding expectations - by defining what the expectations are as to the existance or non-existance of such a thing, alters what properties it would need to possess in order to remain random relative to those.
For example, if we flip a coin 20 times in a row and it lands heads up every time, is that more or less random than flipping the same coin 20 times in a row and having some other result? Notice that all combinations should ideally be just as likely as any other (of these 2^20~=1 million) combination(s), but if you vary your expectations, such as preferring a simple description of 20 heads instead of some larger description of the sequence, then it may appear that 20 heads in a row was not "random" despite it being just as likely (for a "fair" coin etc.) as head, tail, tail, head, head, head, head, tail, head, ...
Of course we prefer "simple" descriptions, but what's simple is also relative to the manners in which we understand and organize things, so what's random is dependent upon what we see as non-random structures and so randomness is defined inn many ways by non-randomness - the two are just flip sides of the same coin - did you expect a head or a tail - half the time, you'll prove the laws of physics are entirely predetermined and there is no such thing as non-deterministic events

Of course when we drop an apple it doesn't rise in the air half the time, but that's not the only possible (again there's a subjective measure as to what things are possible) result and if we dig down and look a bit closer we find that not all aspects of a falling apple are entirely predictable.